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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
BILLS AND NoTEs-LIABiLuTy OF ANOMALOUS INDORSER UNDER THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw. Overland Auto Co. v. Winters., This
case raises the much discussed questions as to the liability of a person
who places his name on the back of a note prior to or at the time of
delivery. A and B, associates in business, contracted to purchase an
auto to be used in their business from C, the agent of the plaintiff
company. In payment C took a note payable to himself, signed by A
as maker and indorsed on the back by B prior to delivery. The note
read, "We promise to pay." Plaintiff having failed to aver presentment and notice so as to charge B as an indorser contended that he was
liable as maker. The majority of the Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that under the Negotiable Instruments Law,2 such a party is
deemed an indorser and that no evidence is receivable to show that
he intended to bind himself in any other capacity. In a dissenting
opinion, ELLISON, P. J., expressed a doubt as to this proposition, sug-

1. (1915) 180 S. W. 560. This case has been commented on In 29
Harvard Law Review 549 and In 25 Yale Law Journal 411.
2. Revised Statutes 1909, § 10033, 10034.
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gesting that the ambiguity created by the word "we" In the promise
might justify the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that such
party was not one of that class of persons whose liability is fixed by
the act, namely, those signing "otherwise than as maker" or those
"not otherwise a party to the instrument."
Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, there existed a great
diversity of decisions as to this question, and it was the evident pur.
pose of the framers of the act in the enactment of sections 10033
and 100343 to fix the liability of such a party beyond dispute. In a
majority of the cases arising under the law, these sections have been
held to fix the anomalous indorser's liability as that of indorser and
to preclude the Introduction of any extrinsic evidence to vary that
liability.4 The act, however, has not been unamimously so construed.
A few cases hold that only a prima facie liability as indorser is created,
which may be explained away by parol evidence.5
How far do ambiguities upon the face of the instrument Justify
a resort to parol evidence? Admitting that a person has signed "otherwise than as maker" the act settles the question, for such a person's
liability can be other than that of Indorser only in case he "clearly
indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some
other capacity." But by what means is it to be determined whether
a person has signed otherwise than as maker? Does the act refer to
persons who intend to sign in another capacity than that of maker
irrespective of the place of signature, or does it refer to persons who
place their signatures in other than the usual place for the maker's
signature? If the class is determined by the intention and that intention be ascertainable by extrInsic evidence, the purpose of the act
is defeated. But if, tho a person signs in the usual place for an indorser's signature, there appears something upon the face of the instrument which indicates that his liability was intended to be that of
maker, it might be contended that extrinsic evidence should be resorted to. Such a contention might not be without merit were section
10033 alone to be considered. But section 10034 is more definite as
to the class affected by it, applying to "a person,, not otherwise a
party to an instrument" who "places his signature thereon in blank
before delivery." Viewing the two sections together in the light of the
3. The corresponding sections of'the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
are .i 63, 64.
4. Rockflald v. First National Bank (1907) 77 Ohio St. 311, 83 N. E.
392, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842; Gibbs v. Guaraglia (1907) 75 N. J. Law, 168, 67
Atl. 81; McDonald v. Luckenbach. (1909) 170 Fed. 434; Mechanics etc. Bank
v. Katterjohn (1910) 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071. See collection of cases
in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 77.
5. Kohn v. Consolidated etc. Co. (1900) 63 N. Y. Snpp. 265 (semble);
Mercantile 'Bank V. Busby (1908) 120 Tenn. 652, 113 S. W. 390; Haddock,
Blanchard & Co. v. Haddock (1908) 192 N. Y. 499, 85 N. E. 682.
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circumstances which led to the adoption of these provisions of the
act, it seems preferable to hold that the act fixes the anomalous indorser's liability as that of indorser in all cases where it does not
appear clearly from the instrument itself that he was intended to be
bound in another capacity. This proposition is greatly strengthened,
if indeed it is not established beyond controversy, by section 9988
which provides that "where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same
intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser." The effect of this
section seems not to have been considered by either the majority or
the dissenting judge.6
Conceding that under the facts of the principal case B was liable
as an indorser, is he such an indorser as may claim presentment and
notice? It is difficult to see how the holder can be relieved of the
duty to give notice of dishonor by virtue of section 10085 on the
theory that A was an accommodation maker. An accommodation party
is defined by section 10000 as one who signs "without receiving value
therefor." A can hardly be brought within this definition since he
and B together received the consideration for the note. If it be
accurate to say that as to the interest which B received in the property
A is an accommodation maker, the consequence must inevitably follow
that with respect to the interest which A received in the property, B
is an accommodation indorser. Under this theory B would be at the
same time both an accommodation and an accommodated indorser, in
the one capacity entitled and in the other not entitled to claim demand
and notice.
There has been considerable controversy as to the proper inter7
Probably
pretation of section 10000 (section 29 of the uniform act).
the better view is that "without receiving value therefor" means uwthout receiving any value for the bill and not without receiving any
consideration for lending his name.8 Even under this construction,
the one most favorable to the plaintiff in the principal case, A would
not be an accommodation maker since he received value from the
payee for the bill, and not merely a consideration for lending his name.
These considerations seem to impel the conclusion of the majority
of the court that B was an indorser and as such entitled to both presentment and notice.
DEAN H. LEOPARD
6. Section 9988, paragraph 6, imposing a joint and several liability
upon two or more persons who sign an instrument containing the words "I

promise to pay," suggests a danger of attaching too much Importance to
the number of the subject of the promise.
7. See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 162 et seq., for an account of the Ames-Brewster controversy on this point.
8. Morris County Brick Co. v. Auston (1910) 79 N. J. Law 273, 75 AtI. 550.
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Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry. Co., The defendant constructed a street
railway in Kansas City between March, 1899 and July, 1900. On
September 24, 1904, the plaintiff began suit for $35,000 damages for
injury alleged to have been caused to his property by the construction
and operation of the railway. On April 25, 1906, the defendant had
judgment and on September 13, 1906, the plaintiff appealed the case
to the Supreme Court which on May 31, 1909 reversed the judgment
and remanded the cause for a new trial because of error committed at
the trial.2 At the second trial in October, 1910 the plaintiff had judgment for $5000. On June 7, 1911 the defendant appealed to the Kansas
City Court of Appeals which on June 3, 1913 transferred the case to
the Supreme Court under the statute of 1911.3 The case was argued
before the Supreme Court en banc on April 28, 1913, and in an opinion
delivered on April 2, 1914 it was transferred back to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals on the ground that the statute in question was unconstitutional.4 This opinion was by a court divided four to three.
On June 14, 1915, the Kansas City Court of Appeals rendered an opinion
again transferring the cause to the Supreme Court on the ground that
it involved a constitutional question which had not been considered
by the Supreme Court on the previous transfer.5 On November 4,
1915, the case was again argued before the Supreme Court en banc
and on December 8, 1915, it was again transferred back to the Kansas
City Court of Appeals on the ground that no interpretation of the Constitution was necessary to a decision.e On May 1, 1916 the Kansas City
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a
new trial.
This history is reviewed because of its bearing on the defects in
the organization of Missouri courts. The case is not typical, and it is
not often that litigation is so prolonged or that such confusion exists
between courts; but it is not the only case in which such confusion
has existed.7 It is a sufficient indictment of the system that such a
bandying of a case should be possible. This fault is not the courts'it is inherent in the Missouri system of court organization. It is bad
enough that the plaintiff should be made to wait so many years and
1.
2.

(1915) 181 S. W. 76.
(1909) 221 Mo. 46, 119 S. W. 1094.

The case was heard by Divi-

sion One of the Supreme Court, LAMm, 'W1ODSON and GRAVES, JJ., being present.
3. (1912) 166 Mo. App. 207. In 1909 the jurisdiction of the Courts of
Appeals was enlarged from $4500 to $7500. Laws of 1909, p. 397, Revised
Statutes 1909, § 3937. In 1911, the act enlarging the jurisdiction was amended
by adding "that the Supreme Court shall retain and have full exclusive appellate jurisdiction in any case pending in which the Supreme Court has made
any decision or ruling." Laws of 1911, p. 190.
4. (1914) 257 Mo. 555, 166 S. W. 272. A rehearing was denied on April
13, 1914.
5. (1915) 177 S. W. 1102. A rehearing was denied on July 2, 1915.
6. (1915) 181 S. W. 77.
7. See for instance, Smith v. Glynn (1912) 144 . W. 149, (1915) 177 S.
W. 848, (1916) 183 S. W. 681.
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to conduct such expensive litigation to get the redress to which he
may be entitled; but it is difficult to Justify his being sent four times
to another court to get his relief. And the end Is not yet1 It is still
possible that the case may again be taken to the Kansas City Court
of Appeals and on to the Supreme Court.
But there are more serious results than possible injustice to this
particular plaintiff. Such confusion tends to undermine the confidence
of the public in the whole judicial system; it entails a serious congestion of dockets when so much of the courts' time must be consumed
in deciding questions of Jurisdiction among themselves; it spells
a waste of the courts' time and the state's money in the determination
of problems which in a simpler system would be non-existent; in
short, it is to some degree responsible for the existing situation in
the appellate courts, all of which are overworked and two of which
are notoriously behind their dockets.
Can a simpler system be devised? In 1913, the Missouri Bar
Association adopted a resolution looking toward the merger of the
Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court and the organization of new
divisions of the latter.8 A unified system of appellate courts would
make impossible such a history as that of Rourke v. Holmes St. By.
Co., and it would mean a large measure of relief from the congestion
and delays and consequent injustices in the present system.
MANLEY 0. HUDSON
EsTATEs-ImPLcATIoN

oF

REmAINDERs-ALIENABILITY

OF

CON-

TINGENT RLMAINDER13-ENLAE~MENT OF ESTATES. Faris v. EwoinglA testator devised certain land to his son John and his daughter
Mollie, under the express conditions "that neither of these devisees
having any children and that If either dies leaving no living child
the other shall Inherit the entire land and if both shall die leaving no
child or children then said lands shall revert to my estate and be
divided amongst my other living children or if dead their children If
any living, said lands cannot be sold by said devisees, except for life
of either or the survivor but if they or either of them shall have any
living children then said lands shall be an absolute gift." John later
married and died leaving the plaintiff hiw only child; Mollie still
lives childless. After the birth of the plaintiff, John and Mollie
attempted to convey the land and the defendant claims under this
conveyance. The court was unable to agree on the construction to be
put on the will. WALKER and GRAvEs, JJ., thought that John and
Mollie took the fee which could be aliened after the birth of a child
to either; they therefore denied any interest tO the plaintiff and
8.

1913 Proceedings of Missouri Bar Association, p. 27 et seq.

1.

(1916)

183 S. W. 280.
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wanted to declare the defendant owner of the entire land. WOODSON
and BLAIR, JJ., thought that John and Mollie took only life estates,
with an implied contingent remainder as to the share of each in its
child or children, and an alternate contingent remainder limited on
the death of either without a living child to the other; they concluded
that the plaintiff was invested with the fee to that half given to her
father, and a contingent remainder in fee in Mollie's half. BOND and
FARIs, JJ., thought that each took a life estate which upon the birth
of a child to one was to become a fee in that one, and subject to this
possibility each took a contingent remainder in the land of the other;
they seem to have concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to no
interest in the half devised to her father, since it had passed by his
conveyance, but that she was entitled to a contingent remainder in
fee in the half devised to Mollie. The per curiamn opinion, analysed
elsewhere in this number of the Law Series, purported to be a compromise giving half of the land to the defendant; whether the plaintiff
took the other half is not clear, tho as a result of the opinions the
plaintiff was entitled to only a contingent remainder in a half.
The language of this will is so rare and so confused that the case
is of little value as a precedent of interpretation. Comment on the
construction would be profitless therefore. But some phases of the
case seem to merit attention, viz., the implication of remainders, the
apparent oversight of the alienability of contingent remainders, and
the enlargement of estates.
Two of the judges, WOODSON and BLAIR, who thought that life
estates were conferred on the first devisees, were willing to imply
remainders in their children. They read the gift to be to John and
Mollie for life, and if either dies without a child or children living at
his death, then his half should go to the other. So read, the case goes
far in implying a remainder to the child or children. The implication
of estates tail where there is a devise to A for life or in fee with a
gift over on his death without issue, is familiar enough.2 Since the
statute making failures of issue definite, this implication has been
discontinued;3 the implication depended on an indefinite failure of
issue and probably had its origin in an effort to escape the rule against
perpetuities. To justify an implied gift to the child when there is a
devise to A for life and a gift over if A dies without a surviving child,
there should be a clear intention that the child is to take. In the
principal case, WOODSON and BLAIR, JJ., seemed to assume this intention. They took for granted a desire of the testator to preserve the
land to the donees and their children. WALKER and GRAVEs, JJ., ex2. See an article on Estates Tail In Missouri, in 1 Law Series, Missouri
Bulletin, 9. See also, Theobald, Wills (5th ed.) p. 642.
3. Yocum v. Siler (1900) 160 Mo. 281; Ganon v. Albright (1904) 183
Mo. 238.
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pressly refused to imply a gift to the donees' children, relying chiefly
on the fact that the first donees were not limited to life estates. Of
course express estates will never be cut short by the implication of
other estates, for the chief purpose of the implication is to supply a
hiatus.4 In view of the fact that there has been so little discussion
in the Missouri reports of the implication of remainders, it is to be
regretted that the point did not receive more attention in Faris v.
Ewing.
Four of the judges, WOODSON, BLAIR, BOND, and FARmS, seem to
have concluded that John had a contingent remainder in Mollie's undivided half of the land and the per curiam opinion seems to have at
least left it open to the plaintiff as heir of John to claim a remainder
in this half.s But this quite overlooks the fact that if John had a
contingent remainder it passed to the trustee by his conveyance and
from the trustee to the defendant. The possibility of conveying a contingent remainder is now settled in Missouri. Tho not alienable at
common law,6 it was included in the statute of 1865 which provided
for conveying "any estate or interest" in land by deed.' If John had
a contingent remainder in Mollie's undivided half, it passed by his
deed tho the contingency should not occur until after his death. The
will made no express gift of Mollie's half to the child of John. It
is submitted that the four judges who apparently gave the plaintiff
John's contingent remainder in Mollie's half, overlooked this point.
But their conclusion also necessitated saying that the contingent
remainder given to John by the will could descend to the plaintiff
as his heir. No sound reason Is perceived why a contingent remainder
should not be a descendible interest in cases whore the survivorship
of the remainderman Is not a part of the contingency; but numerous
statements may be found in the Missouri reports to the effect that
contingent remainders are not descendible.S The judges in Faris v.
Ewing seemed to assume that a contingent remainder is descendible,
but Hauser v. Murrayg seems to be clearly contra and Faris v. Ewing
cannot be taken to have overruled it. It seems clear that four of the
Judges overlooked both the alienability and the non-descendibility of
the plaintiff's father's contingent remainder in the undivided half devised to the defendant's wife, and that if these had been perceived
the result as to that part of the land should have been otherwise.
4.
5.

1 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) p. 669.

The effect of the per curiam opinion has been analysed in another

comment on this case. Post. p. 58.
6. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 365.
7. Revised Statutes 1865, e. 109, 4 1, Revised Statutes 1909, 1 2787;
Godinan v. Simmons (1893) 113 Mo. 122; Summet v. Realty Co. (1.907) 208
Mo. 501. See 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 15.
8. Delassus v. Gateicood (1880) 71 Mo. 371; Payne v. Payne (1893)
119 Mo. 174; Hauser v. Murray (1913) 256 Mo. 58, 97. See also Dickerson
v. Dickerson (1907) 211 Mo. 483; Sullivan v. Garesehe (1910) 229 Mo. 496.
9. (1913) 256 Mo. 58.
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One further point seems worthy of comment. BOND and Fmus, JJ.,
thought that John and Mollie each took an estate for life, subject to
be enlarged into a fee by the birth of a child. What is this process
of enlargement? The common law gave definite rules which, once
the intention is ascertained, can be so applied as to enable one to say
exactly what estates exist in particular land at any time. By the
law of merger two estates in the same land vested in the same person
at the same time may be so joined that the present would be swallowed
up into the future estate, and since it is one of the requisites of a
merger that the expectant estate should be at least as large in legal
contemplation as the present estate, merger may without impropriety
be spoken of as a process of enlargement. There is also the enlargement of estates on condition as first explained in Lord Stafford's Case,1o
in such instances as where a testator devised land to A for life on
condition that if A performed a certain condition he should have the
fee. A takes a life estate which is said to be subject to enlargement
on condition. Some commentators write of this as tho A took an estate
for life with a contingent remainder in fee and as tho the enlargement
occurred by merger when the remainder vested; but the result of Lord
Stafford's Case cannot be so explained inasmuch as the particular
estate was a fee tail which could not be merged into a fee simple.
This enlargement must be something more than merger therefore.ll
Lord Coke required four incidents for an estate subject to enlargement: (1) a particular estate; (2) a continuance of this particular
estate in the grantee until the increase happens; (3) the immediate
vesting of the increase on the happening of the condition; (4) the
particular estate and the increase ought to take effect by one and the
same instrument or by several instruments delivered at the same
time. These incidents are stated as necessary, also, by Fearne,12 by
Cruise,'5 and by Sheppardl4 who adds a fifth incident, viz., that the
condition must be lawful.
Such enlargement of estates, while recognized by Coke,15 Fearne,
Smith, Cruise, Sheppard, Preston,16 and seemingly Sugden,17 has apparently not been noticed by more recent writers such as Williams,
Leake, Challis, Gray, Washburn and Tiffany. It seems not to have
10.

(1609)

8 Coke 146.

11. The distinction between a limitation enlarging
der is sharply drawn In Smith, Executory Limitations,
12. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 279.
13. Cruise, Digest, 283.
14. Sheppard, Touchstone, p. 128.
15. See Coke, Littleton, 217b.
16. 2 Preston, Abstracts, 188.
17. Sugden's reference is quite bare. 1 Sugden,
89. See also 2 Blackstone, Commentaries (Lewis' ed.)

en estate and a remain§ 163.

Powers (3d Amer. ed.)
152.
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been recognized by the Missouri court until Sheppard v. Fisher.'s The
principle is now applied by BOND and FMIis, JJ., in Faris v. Ewing,
but without any clear enunciation of it; but accepting the construction
put on the will by these judges, the principle cannot be applied to both
of the undivided halves, if the incidents as required by Lord Coke still
obtain. Lord Coke required that the devisee of the particular estate
to be enlarged should keep it until after the increase actually occurred,
in order to preserve the privity between the testator and devisee. In
Faris v. Ewing, John continued to hold his life estate until after the
birth of the plaintiff, so that this incident was fulfilled; but Mollie
conveyed before any child was born with the result that her life estate
cannot be enlarged into a fee thereafter, if the dictum of Lord Coke,
approved by Fearne, Cruise, Preston and Sheppard Is to be followed.
Privity was required because of the nature of conveyancing at common law. If this requirement is to be abandoned it must be justified
by the change in the methods of conveyance.
But if the Missouri court is to apply this principle of enlarging
estates it owes it to the profession to clearly define it. Is it the common law principle applied by Lord Coke in Lord Stafford's Case, or
is it some new principle? If a particular estate is liable to be enlarged,
may it be followed by a vested remainder? Or must any limitation
thereafter be contingent? These questions cannot be answered from
the Missouri cases and authorities elsewhere are very meager.
MANLEY

ESTATES-LIFE

ESTATE

on

FEE

SIMPLE-VALIDITY

0.
OF

HUDSON

ExECUTORY

LIMITATION AFTER A FEE. Middleton v. Duddingl-This case involved
the construction of a devise of land to the testator's wife Annie "as
her absolute property", with a proviso in the codicil that "should Annie
die without a will or having disposed of the property" it should go
over to the plaintiffs in the action. Annie died intestate and without having disposed of the land. In Division One, RAiLEY, C., was of
the opinion that Annie took a life estate with power of disposal of
the fee by will or deed, and that the gift over took effect as a remainder; but this view was not taken by the court which in an
opinion by BOND, J., held that Annie took the fee, that the words in
the codicil were not strong enough to cut it down, and that the gift
over on a failure to exercise the power of disposal was void. This
view was taken by all of the court en banc except WOODSON, C. J.,
18.

(1907)

206 Mo. 208.

For a criticism of Sheppard v. Fisher, see 3

Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 14;

11 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 21.

In the latter comment, in note 84, it is erroneously stated that the enlargment
of estates as described by Coke seems to have been no more than an application
of the law of merger.
1.

(1916)

183 S. W. 443.
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who approved the opinion of RAILEY, C., and went much further in the
application of the statute directing courts "concerned in the execution
of will" to have due regard to testators' intent and directions.2
In the last number of the Law Series the writer attempted a complete survey of the subject of executory limitations in Missouri law
and made a special study of limitations after a fee in the event of a
non-exercise of an added power of disposal. The protest there made
against the principle that any limitation after a fee simple with added
power of disposal is void, has been more than justified by the principal
case; and the bad effect of that principle in causing such division on
the question of whether the first taker has a fee or a life estate is
nowhere better exemplified.
It is most unfortunate that the court
applied the principle in this case, without any clear statement of it
and without any discussion of the reason for it.
If the testator's wife took a life estate under the will the gift over
is of a valid remainder; if she took a fee the gift over is void as a
remainder because of the impossibility of limiting a remainder after a
fee, and void as an executory devise because of the indefensible rule
noted above and applied by the Missouri court in Green v. Sutton,s Cornwell v. Wulff,4 and Roth v. Rauschenbusch.5 The whole contest raged
around the preliminary question whether a life estate or a fee simple
was conferred on the first taker. Since the decision of Walton v. Drumtra,6 overruling Cornwell v. Wulff,7 and the opinion in Gibson v. Gibson,8 it should have been supposed that every effort would be made to
find that a life estate had been conferred on the first taker in order to
escape the frustration of intention consequent on the application of
the principle that if the first taker is given a fee with added power of
disposal the gift over is void. The opinion of RAILEY, C., justified this
expectation. But the opinion of'BOND, J., revives the uncertainty prevailing at the time the Cornwell cases were decided, and it seems
clear that the court will not longer shrink from finding that the first
taker has a fee even tho it involves the invalidity of the gift over.
But this ought to be more clearly stated by the court, which owes it
to the profession to give some justification for the principle which it
has here applied without even so much as a statement of it.
Some passages in the opinion of BOND, J., are indeed surprising.
For instance, "The unlimited power to convey or will away property
are the essential attributes of an estate in fee. To concede the right
2.

Revised Statutes 1909, 1 583, first enacted In 1815, 1 Missouri Terri-

torial Laws, p.
3. (1872)
4. (1898)
187. 5. (1903)
6. (1899)
7. (1898)
8. (1911)

411.
50 Mo. 186.
148 Mo. 542.
173 Mo. 582.

152 Mo. 489.
148 Mo. 542.
239 Mo. 490.

See also Cornieell v. Orton (1894) 126 Mo. 355.
See also Young v. Robinson (1906) 122 Mo. App.
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in a grantee to exercise these functions is to concede a fee simple in
such grantee." Surely these words cannot be read literally for it has
so often been held that the addition of a power of disposal does not
convert a life estate into a fee,9 that it would now seem beyond question. Again, Judge BOND says that the testator "attempted to make adouble devise of the fee. It is too clear for elaboration that this can
never be done." This amounts to saying that no executory limitation
after a fee is valid, whether by way or springing or shifting use. The
writer has attempted to show in the last number of the Law Serieslo
that executory limitations following fees simple have a secure place
in Missouri law since Sul'ivan v. Gareschell and certainly springing
executory interests are secure since O'Day v. Meadows.12 The dicta in
Stmmons v. Cabannels are out of consonance with all the modern
cases. Judge BOND himself in Brown v. Tuschoff14 in Buckner v. Buckner 1 5 recognized the validity of executory limitations after fees simple. Judge WOODSON pointed out this error of Judge BOND'S by saying
that "even at common law, under the doctrine of contingent remainders, executory devises and springing and shifting uses, a fee upon a
fee, or any lesser estate, could be granted thereafter." But It is submitted that this, too, is error, if it means that a contingent remainder
can be limited after a fee.
Another suggestion of Judge WOODSON's is pregnant with interesting consequences. He says that the statutee was "designed to do
away with the necessity of resorting to the children of executory
devices [devises] and springing and shifting uses in order to cut
down a fee given to the first devisee and to give a remainder over
upon the happening of a contingency stated in the will cutting down
the fee in the first taker." The position seems to be that the statute
enjoining regard to the testator's intention in the execution of a will
abrogated all rules of law which might defeat Intention. This would
afford relief from the artificial rule that a fee with added power of disposal cannot be followed by a gift over, and such relief may in some future decision come this way. Some passages in Gibson v. Gibsonl7
seem to indicate the same idea. But such a construction of the statute was not hinted at in the century of its appllcation,s until Gibson
v. Gibson. And if the construction be sound, it would have enabled
9. Gregory v. Cowgill (1854) 19 Mo. 415; Lewis v. Pitman 101 Mo. 281;
Garland v. Smith (1901) 164 Mo. 1.
10. 11 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin 3.
11. (1910) 229 Mo. 496.
12.

18.

14.
15.

(1905) 194 Mo.
(1903) 177 Mo.
(1911) 235 Mo.
(1913) 255 Mo.

588.
336.
449.
371.

16. The Chief Justice seems to have been referring to Revised Statutes
1909,
579, but he must have had in mind § 583.
17. (1911) 239 Mo. 490.
18. Revised Statutes 1909, . 583 was first enacted In 1815.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

the courts to abandon the rule in Shelley's Case and the common law
meaning of "die without issue" without statutory authority. It may
well be argued that it would also have abrogated the rule against perpetuities. The statute was first enacted in 1815, one year before the
adoption of the common law in Missouri, and it would seem that such
a general enactment concerning testators' intentions should not prevent the recognition of well defined principles even tho they may defeat testators' intentions, such as the rule against perpetuities for instance. Judge WOODSON'S position would mean that any future limitation is to be effectuated and that the statute has abolished all differences between contingent remainders and executory devises. Tho
Buckner v. Buckner seems to give color of soundness to this position,
it seems improbable that such a revolution has been actually effected.
Counsel in Middleton v. Dudidng made the mistake of not contending for an abandonment of the rule that any limitation after a fee with
added power of disposal is void, as applied in Green v. Sutton, Cornwell v. Wulff and apparently in Roth v. Rauschenbusch.19 Until that
rule is abandoned, there can be no end to the litigation on the question whether the first taker has a life estate or a fee. Middleton v.
Dudding revives the uncertainty which since Walton v. Drumtra and
Gibson v. Gibson was diminishing. No one should be content with
any opinion on such a will as that involved in Middleton v. Dudding
until the highest court has expressed itself-it seems really a situation for the last guess of the Supreme Court, for it must be admitted
that since most testators will not stop to weigh these niceties it is the
supposed and not the actual intention which is to be found. Every
such will must therefore be taken to the Supreme Court, with the
result of further congesting its already overcrowded docket. This
must continue until the abandonment of a rule for which no attempt at
justification has been made in the numerous opinions dealing with it.
MANLEY 0. HUDSON
FIXTURES-EFFECT

OF ANNEXATION

BY LESSOR FOR USE

OF LESSEE.

Cunningham v. Von Mayesl-The federal government leased a store
building in Caruthersville for ten years for use as a post office. In compliance with a stipulation in the lease, the lessor equipped the building with post-office furniture and cabinets and tables. Some of the
cabinets were fastened to the ceiling by braces and to the floor by
nails and screws and served as a partition between the space in which
the mail was worked and the part which was open to the public. A
judgment creditor of the lessor caused execution to be levied on the
realty and it was sold to the plaintiff, subject to the lessee's term;
19. For the basis for such a contention, see 11
letin, p. 37 et seq.
1. (1916) 182 S. W. 1059.
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another judgment creditor caused execution to be levied on the post
office furniture and fixtures as the personal property of the lessor
and they were about to be sold when the plaintiff filed his bill against
the sheriff and the execution creditor to enjoin such sale. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to enjoin the
sale, on the ground that the post office fixtures had not become a part
of the realty but had retained their character as personalty.
The Missouri courts have frequently approved the three-fold test
for determining whether a chattel has become a fixture: (1) actual
annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto;
(2)
adaptibility to the use of the realty to which it is annexed; (3) intention that the annexed chattel shall be a permanent accession to
the land, such intention "being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation and the purpose, the use
for which the annexation has been made." This test was applied in
the leading Missouri case of Rogers v. Crow,2 in which an organ affixed
by only a few nails to the floor of an alcove in a church was held to be
a part of the realty.
Applying this test to the present case it would seem that the
articles were actually annexed to the realty; that they were adapted
to the uses of the realty; and that an intention of permanency can be
reasonably Inferred. The suggestion of the court that the annexation
might have been for the purpose of steadying the cabinets seems untenable in view of the fact that post offices generally follow this
plan to secure greater convenience for the delivery of mail and also
to give security and protection to the mail and articles of value within
the distributing room; the annexation was also to secure permanency
to the cabinets as a partition. In Williams v. Lanes shelves put in a
building used by a tenant as a store room, passed to the vendee as lixtures. In Cohen v. Kyler,4 a bath tub and two sinks nailed to the
floor and walls were sufficiently annexed to be fixtures; so in Sosmon
v. Conlon,5 stage scenery and fittings of standard size, hung 'by pulleys and ropes, which could be used in any standard theater. In
Thomas v. Davis,6 HENRY, J., stated that "annexation must be permanent, tho slight, and it need not be such that if severed, such severance will involve the destruction, Impairment or substantial Injury
of the freehold." Following that, the annexation by means of screws

2.

(1867) 40 Mo. 91. See the comment on Americon Clay Maechinery
Co.
.
174 Mo. App. 485, 160 S W. 903, in 3

v. Selalia Brick & Tile Co. (1913)
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 42.
3. (1895) 62 Mo. App. 66.
4. (1858) 27 Mo. 122.
5. (1894) 57 Mo. App. 25.

6.

(1891)

(1882) 76 Mo. 72, 78, cited In Donnewald v. Turner Real Estate Co.

44 Mo. App. 350.
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and nails and braces to the floor and ceiling of the building was sufficient to give the partition with its component parts the character of
realty.
The court in its opinion seemed to emphasize the facts that .the
building was being used only temporarily as a post office, that it was
not constructed for a post office; that the post office fixtures were
put in the building for the temporary use of the building as a post
office; and that such fixtures could be easily removed without injury to the freehold; and that they probably would be so moved when
the United States ceased to occupy the premises as a post office. In
Donnewald v. Turner Real Estate Co.,7 it was contended that a boiler
and engine placed in the basement by a tenant for use In manufacturing silverware, were not fixtures "because the evidence tended to show
that the annexation was for a mere temporary purpose, and not for
the permanent and substantial improvement of the building itself,"
but the court held the annexation sufficient. If this is true where the
tenant made the annexation for his own use, it ought to be equally as
true when the annexation Is made by the owner of the realty for the
use of a tenant. It seems immaterial that the building was not
originally designed for a post office, inasmuch as the fixtures in question were adapted for it use as such.
The court distinguished this case from Crane v. Construction Go.,8
St. Louis Radiator Co. v Carrol,9 and Sosmon V. Conlon, in which
the fire hose screwed on to the permanent stand pipe, the stage scenery
hung by pulleys and ropes in a theater, and the hot water radiators
connected with pipes from a boiler in the basement, were a part of the
architectural design of the building. That the article fits into the architectual design is important in determining a fixture only when there
is constructive or slight annexation as in Rogers v. Crow, and Sosmon v.
Conlon. In the present case we have actual, physical, and permanent
annexation for a permanent purpose; and it seems of little importance
that the building was a general store room and could be used for other
purposes. If it had been used as a grocery store, the counters and
shelves would have become fixtures; if as a saloon, the bar would have
passed with the realty; and if as a drug store, the show cases, prescription cases, and shelves would have become fixtures.
It is common for such articles, prepared in the factory, to become
a part of the realty, by being placed in and annexed to a general store
room similar to this one. The uses to which the store room may be
put are many, but the articles adapted to present use become a part
7.
8.
9.

(1891)
(1906)
(1897)

44 Mo. App. 350, 353, 354.
121 Mo. App. 209.
72 Mo. App. 315.
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of the building whether it be for a saloon, a drug store, a clothing store,
a book store, or a general store room.1 0
The fact was emphasized ,by the court that the United States is the
only tenant that will use such fixtures, while fixtures used by one tenant In the drug business may be used by another tenant in the same
business. A monopoly does not change the character of the articles
used and the probability that an article will be used for a long period
does not affect the character of the chattel annexed. The bars placed
in a saloon licensed to run for only one year,l" or the prescription cases
and shelves placed in a drug store under a lease for one year12 become
fixtures notwithstanding the shortness of the period during which such
articles are to be used. Permanency is determined by present facts and
not by future probabilities.13 And it is of no importance in this case
that the articles can be taken out without injury to the freehold, if the
building be no longer used as a post office.14 It seems difficult to justify
the principle case on the reasons which controlled previous decisions
as to fixtures and the case may be the basis for future decisions that
erections by lessors for the benefit of their tenants do not become
realty.
ROSCOE E. HARPER
JUDGMENTS-WHEN 1S THE SUrREME COURT EQUALLY DIVIDED, AND
WHAT IS THE EFFECT? Faris v. Ewing-An action to try the title to
certain land involved the construction of a will. In the trial court,
judgment had been given for the defendants. Six judges sat in the
case when it was heard by the Supreme Court. Two judges, WALKER
and GRAVES, so construed the will that the plaintiff took no interest in
the land, and they voted to affirm the judgment of the trial court; two
judges, WoODsoN and BLAIR, so construed the will that the plaintiff
would take a vested fee simple in an undivided half of the land and a
contingent remainder in fee in the other undivided half, and they voted
to reverse the judgment; two judges, BOND and FARIS, so construed the
10. Fixtures: Tabor v. Robinson (N. Y., 1862) 36 Barbour 483 (counters,
shelves and drawers); Conner v. Squires (1878) 50 Vt. 680 (drawers); Rinzel v. Stumpf (1903) 116 Wis. 287, 93 N. W. 36 (counters) : Barringer v.
Evenson (Wis. 106) 106 N. W. 801 (prescription cases and shelves with glass
doors In a drug store) ; Voodham v. First National Bank (Minn., 1892) 50 N.
W. 1015 (bar in a saloon) ; Smyth v, Sturgis (1888) 108 N. Y. 495 (a lightly
constructed and easily removable partition).
Trade Fixtures: Williams v.
Lane (1895) 62 Mo. App. 66 (shelves in a store room) ; McCall v. Walter
(1883) 71 Ga. 287 (shelves and counters) Roth v. Collins (1899) 109 Iowa
501, 80 N. W. 543 (shelves and counters set up in sections In building leased
for one year as a drug store) ; Smusch V. Kohn (1898) 49 N. Y. S. 170 (bevel
glass cabinet partition and show case).
11. Woodham v. First Nat'l. Bank of Crookston (1892) 50 N. W. (Minn.)
1015.
12. Roth v. Collins (1899) 109 Iowa 501, S0 N. W,. 543.
13. State v. Marshall ( 1877) 4 Mo. App. 29.
14. Thomas v. Dazis (1882) 76 Mo. 72; State v. Marshall (1874) 4 Mo.
App. 29; Donneiwald v. Turner Real Estate Co. (1891) 44 Mo. App. 350;
Cohen v. Kyler (1858) 27 Mo. 122.

1.

(1916) 183 S. )I. 280.
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will that the plaintiff would take a contingent remainder in an undivided half of the land and they too voted for a reversal. In this
situation, the court stated that a judgment could not be entered, and
"for the purpose of reaching a judgment in this much litigated case" but
still adhering to their views as expressed, WALKER and GRAVES, JJ.,
consented to a judgment that one half of the property be vested in the
defendant absolutely and to this extent they concurred with BOND and
FARIS, JJ.
This presents an interesting question of the effect of a divided
court. If the six judges had divided three to three on whether the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed or reversed, the proper
course apart from constitutional restriction would have been to affirm
the judgment below. 2 Such an affirmance is called an "affirmance of necessity."2 But the Constitution has prescribed that "when the judges
sitting shall be equally divided in opinion, no judgment shall be entered based on such a division," but that "some person learned in the
law" shall be called in to assist in a decision.3 If the division in the
principal case had been three to three the constitutional provision would
have made it incumbent on the court to call in an outsider.4 But would
the constitutional provision apply if the division among six judges is
into three sets of two each? Such a division is quite probable in an
action to try title under the statute.5 The court would then be equally
divided in opinion, but to call in one outsider would not help matters for
it could not result in a majority vote for any of the three views. The
Constitution does not provide for calling in more than one person for
the provision was clearly phrased with reference to a division of the
judges into two sets, and the words are, "some person" who is to sit
as "one of the judges". But the Constitution forbids the court's entering any judgment in case of equal division, and it is submitted that in
such case there is no course open but to dismiss the appeal (possibly
without going thru the farce of calling in an outsider) with the result
that the judgment of the lower court will stand as the final disposition
of the case, tho it should be noted that this is not an affirmance of
necessity.
As the court summed up the opinions in Faris v. Ewing, the situation would seem to have called for a dismissal of the appeal in accordance with the foregoing; for it was said in the per curiam opinion that
2. See Dubuque v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (1874) 39 Iowa 56; Durant v. Essex County (1868) 7 Wall. 108. See also William Green, Stare Decisis, 14 American Law Review 630. In earlier times, It was the rule that if
an appellate court was evenly divided, no judgment could be entered. Proctor's
Case (1614) 12 Co. 118. The rule Is now well settled otherwise. Gourley v.
Insurance Co. (Mich. 1915) 155 N. W. 483. See 16 Columbia Law Review 352.
3. Constitution of 1875, Art. VI, . 11.
4. In the principal case, one judge who was not sitting might have come
to the rescue.
5. Revised Statutes, 1909,
2535.
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two judges had held that the defendant was entitled to all the land in
controversy; two that he was entitled to but one half of it; and two
that the plaintiff was entitled to all of it. This would seem to be a clear
case of equal division, and on this view the judgment of the lower court
should not have been reversed. But there is nothing in the report to
indicate that the court's attention was directed to the possible application of the constitutional provision.
It seems clear that the effct of the various opinions was not properly stated in the per curiam opinion. The first two judges clearly
thought that the plaintiff was entitled to none of the land; of the other
four, two gave the plaintiff a vested fee in the undivided half devised
to the plaintiff's father and two gave her nothing in it, but all the four
were agreed that the plaintiff had a contingent remainder in fee in the
undivided half previously devised to the defendant's wife. As to this
contingent remainder then, there was enough agreement to warrant a
judgment. But as to the undivided half previously devised to the
plaintiff's father, the first two and the last two judges agreed that the
title was in the defendant, so that judgment could be given to this effect. No reason is percieved why the two halves should not be dealt
with separately and the judgment should therefore have been that the
defendant had good title to the undivided half formerly devised to the
plaintiff's father, and that the plaintiff had a contingent remainder in
fee to the undivided half formerly devised to the defendant's wife. This
seems to have been the court's disposition of the case, tho it is not clear
but that the plaintiff and the defendant might in accordance with the
per curiam opinion each be adjudged to have title to an undivided onehalf of the land; it seems difficult to justify the inconclusiveness of the
judgment which may call for further litigation. Properly interpreted,
the result of the case may be explained without any swerving from
the opinions expressed. But the per curiam opinion gives appearance
to a compromise in that two judges emphasized that their concurrence
was solely for the purpose of permitting a judgment. If this were
true, it is submitted that the Constitution would have required a different course to be pursued, as outlined above.
MANLEY" 0. HUDsoN

MARRIAGE-REQUISITES OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. State v. Rotter.)
State v. Burkrey2-In 1881 an act was passed by the Missouri legislature
providing that "previous to any marriage in this state, a license for
that purpose shall be obtained from the officer herein authorized to issue the same."3 Prior to this act common law marriages were rec1.
2.
S.

(Mo., 1916) 181 S. W. 1158.
(Mo., 1916) 183 S. W. 328.
Laws of 1881, p. 161; Revised Statutes 1909, § 8283.
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ognized in this state and they continued to be legal after the passage of
the act, 4 since the statute does not declare that common law marriages
shall be void.
In general, it seems that any one who may contract a common law
marriage may also contract a statutory marriage. There is, however,
one exception. The age of consent at common law is twelve and fourteen years respectively for female and male. On arriving at these
ages either may enter into a valid common law marriage without the
consent of the parent or guardian.5 But no male under twenty one
years of age or female under eighteen years can procure a license to be
married unless he or she has the consent of the parent or guardian.s
All that is necessary to constitute a common law marriage is a
contract per verba de praesenti by which a man and a woman capable In law of consenting agree and consent to take each other as husband and wife, intending that "such contract is then and there to produce the status." Nothing further, such as cohabitation7 or solemnization,8 is required to consummate the marriage. A contract per verba de
futuro does not constitute marriage; it is only a contract to marry
and requires the relation to be entered into. So if there is a contract
of marriage, per verba de futuro and cohabitation is had on faith of that
contract, the marriage is consummated.9
It is necessary to distinguish between the facts which create a common law marriage and those which only raise a presumption of it.
Circumstances which ordinarily result from marriage, such as cohabitation, acknowledgment and general reputation that the man and
woman living together are husband and wife, raise a rebuttable presumption that the usual cause of these facts, namely marriage, exists,
because the law presumes innocence and not guilt.1o If, however, the
reputation is spasmodic, that is, not general in the community where
the man and woman resided, or if reputation or cohabitation are lacking, the other facts are too weak to raise a presumption of marriage.n1
But when all these facts are present, a presumption of marriage does
not always arise. No presumption of common law marriage arises from
any relation between a white man and negro woman, because such marriages are by statute illegal and absolutely void.12 In a prosecution for
bigamy or adultery, a common law marriage must be proved in fact, and
4. State v. Bittick (1890) 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325; Bishop v. Brittain
Inv. Go. (1910) 229 Mo. 699, 129 S. W. 668.
5. State v. Bittiek (1890) 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325.
6. Revised Statutes 1909, . 8289.
7. Davis v. Stouffer (1908) 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282.
8.
Dyer v. Brannock (1877) 66 Mo. 391.
9. See Davis v. Stouffer (1908) 132 Mo. App. 555, 152 S. W. 282.
10. Cargile v. Wood (1876) 63 Mo. 501; Adair v. Mette (1900) 156 Mo.
496; 57 S. W. 551: Imboden v. Trust Co. (1904) 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S.
11. Bishop v. Brittain Inv. Go. (1910) 229 Mo. 669, 129 S. W. 668.
12. See Keen v. Keen (1904) 184 Mo. 358, 83 S. W. 526; Revised Statutes

. 8280.
W. 268; Plattner v. Plattner (1905) 116 Mo. App. 405, 91 S. W. 457.
1909,
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no presumption arises from cohabitation, acknowledgment and reputa18
Furthermore,
tion tho these facts may be some evidence of marriage.
the common law marriage must be contracted and the cohabitation as
man and wife had in a state where such marriages are recognized before
14
it will be considered a valid marriage in this state.
State v. Rotter presents a nice question in this connection. In 1902
the prosecuting witness married the defendant and lived with him until
1905 when she discovered that the defendant had a wife by a former
marriage still living. The defendant then proposed, "Well, if it Is so
[referring to the prior marriage] it will be be all over with, and you
and I will live together as husband and wife." The prosecuting witness
assented to this. A few months later the defendant obtained a divorce from his first wife and he thereafter continued to cohabit with
the prosecuting witness as her husband for five years. He acknowledged her as his wife and they were reputed to be husband and wife. In
1910, the defendant abandoned her and the prosecution is for this abandonment. The court court held that a common law marriage existed
between prosecuting witness and defendant: the decision went on the
ground that the defendant's proposal was a continuing one and that
the prosecuting witness accepted after the divorce. But she did not
expressly accep~t after the divorce and It is hard to find any acceptance
at all on her part after the divorce unless the continuance of marriage
relations which she had been holding with the defendant constituted
an acceptance. But in Topper v. Perry,15 it had been held that
mere content by the woman to hold marriage relations with the man
on his assertion that the woman was his wife without any promise
on her part to take him as her husband, did not constitute a common
law marriage. But the decision in State v. Rotter can be sustained on
two other grounds. Altho the contract did not create a present status
of marriage, it can be regarded as an executory contract to marry or
a contract of marriage per verbW de futuro. The bona fide holding
of marriage relations by defendant and the prosecuting witness after
the divorce was granted, can be regarded as consummating their contract to marry. This is in accord with the holding in Davis v. Stoutfer.16 The decision can also be rested on the ground that subsequently
to the divorce the defendant and the prosecuting witness cohabitated as
husband and wife, they so recognized each other, and they were so reputed. So notwithstanding the invalidity of their prior contract of marriage as a contract per verba de praesenti, these latter facts raise

13.

State v. Cooper (1890) 103 Mo. 266, 15 S. W. 327; State v. St. John

(1902) 94 Mo. App. 229, 68 S. W. 374.
14. Jordan v. Telephone Go. (1908) 136 Mo. App. 192, 116 S. W. 432.
15. (1906) 197 Mo. 531, 95 S. W. 203.
16. (1908) 182 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282.
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a presumption of marriagel7 which does not appear to have been rebutted.
In State v. Burkrey, it was held to be "necessary that the contract
of common law marriage should be followed by a general and full
-ecognitlon by each of the other as husband and wife." Bishop v. Britian Inv. Co.,18 cited as sustaining this proposition, does not decide this
)oint for the passage quoted from that case had to do with recognition
iot as a necessary element in addition to the contract in establishing
narriage, but only as an element in raising a presumption of marriage
vhen the actual contract cannot be proved on account of the incom)etency of a witness. If nothing more Is meant by the word "recogntIon" than "that by the contract the parties have become and are mar'led for the purpose of assuming and carrying out the marrlage relaion,"19 the case Is supported by Davis v. Stouffer. But if the court
neans by recognition that there must be acknowledgment and repute,
t is submitted that the case is contra to Davis v. Stouffer and is not
ustained by the holding in any other Missouri case.
GARDNER 'SMITlE
17. Rose v. Clark (1841) 8 N. Y. Ch. Rep. 578; Branchard v.
1876) 42 Iowa 228.
18. (1910) 229 Mo. 669. 129 S. W. 668.
19. Dais v. Wtouffer (19081 1.2 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282;

rulett (1896) 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31.
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